Signing keys that rotate themselves, in microseconds — validated on real AWS Nitro Enclave and real AWS CloudHSM hardware.
Signing keys inside a TEE/HSM setup rotate themselves automatically, in microseconds — so a leaked or stolen key is stale before it's worth using, without slowing down signing.
Today, a signing key lives until someone manually notices a breach and rotates it — hours, sometimes weeks. Every minute it stays valid, a stolen key is still a fully usable liability for an attacker.
Interactive HSM key rotation means a real network round trip — our own measured, best-case number (same-VPC, real AWS CloudHSM) is ~120ms, and that's the fast case. Too slow to do continuously on high-throughput signing infrastructure. Teams are forced to choose between frequent rotation and performance.
Hot/warm wallet signing infrastructure, custody platforms, exchange withdrawal signing, payment/settlement message signing, crypto trading bots that sign every order (API keys or on-chain transactions), and any infrastructure — crypto or traditional finance — where a single compromised key can move real funds.
Autonomous key ratcheting — the mechanism, in three steps.
TEE ↔ HSM run one ECDHE handshake and mutual attestation. Agree on K₀. One-time cost: ~0.3-0.5ms.
Each side independently derives session key Kn+1 = HKDF-SHA256(Kn, salt=hardware measurement, info=counter). No network call.
Sliding-window replay protection + signed batch proofs make rollback attacks detectable. Measured: ~3µs/step.
A self-reloading keycard, good for a set number of uses — the signer works at full speed without checking back with the vault each time. If tampered with, it instantly deactivates. Tachpawl does this for cryptographic signing keys.
We don't replace the HSM — it stays the root of trust, generating the master seed and never releasing it. We remove it from the hot path, not from the trust model. Patent pending (USPTO provisional application, priority date 2026-07-13).
Hot/warm wallet withdrawal signing, or payment and settlement message signing, is the highest-value attack surface you operate. Automatic, hardware-backed key rotation shrinks what any single compromised signing key is worth — without adding latency.
If you provide signing infrastructure for other companies' wallets or payment rails, key-rotation frequency is a direct sales argument to your own customers — and one you can currently only offer at a real performance cost.
Auditors and institutional clients increasingly ask about key-rotation policy, not just key-storage policy. Continuous, hardware-enforced rotation is a stronger answer than a manual quarterly rotation runbook.
A real 1,000,000-transaction run on real AWS Nitro + real AWS CloudHSM — measured end to end.
Every number here was measured — none modeled or estimated.
A real, running Rust implementation — HSM-side code validated against both SoftHSM2 and a real, rented AWS CloudHSM cluster; TEE-side code validated end-to-end on a real AWS Nitro Enclave with real NSM hardware attestation (PCR0). Real on-chain settlement is proven too, submitted from outside the enclave since it has no network of its own — 17/17 real broadcasts succeeded.
USPTO provisional patent application filed, priority date 2026-07-13.
Transaction signing uses secp256k1 + Keccak256 — the same primitives EVM chains use, so every signature is natively verifiable on-chain via Ethereum's own ecrecover, no custom verifier needed.
The signing backend is already pluggable behind one Rust trait. Cluster mode (single CloudHSM/SoftHSM2) is the production default today.
Each party runs its own separate process, and a real 2-of-3 threshold-ECDSA ceremony has been run across three genuinely separate AWS machines, converging on one shared public key and one byte-identical signature.
Stockholm, Virginia, and Singapore — signing between the two farthest parties took 4-6 seconds real wall clock, still trivial against a once-per-window amortization argument.
The identical tee-service image also runs, unmodified, on a second real TEE technology.
Beyond AWS Nitro Enclaves, the same Docker image runs inside a real Intel TDX confidential VM (Phala Cloud). A real TDX attestation quote was fetched from live hardware and independently verified against Intel's own certificate chain — not the platform's own say-so.
module_id does. It partially does — it reliably tells two different deployments apart, but a plain restart of the same deployment isn't yet distinguishable that way. We'd rather state that boundary exactly than round it up.
Every number below is a real test run against this exact codebase.
kdf-core: 69 tests. tee-adapter: 11 always-on + 4 real-AWS-S3 + 6 real-Nitro-hardware tests. hsm-adapter: 8 tests against both SoftHSM2 and a real, rented AWS CloudHSM cluster. 98 total, 100% passing, 97% line coverage on locally-testable code.
7 libFuzzer targets across every security-critical boundary — replay protection, rollback detection, attestation verify, ECDHE bootstrap, authorization tokens, frame parsing. Found and fixed 2 real exploitable bugs this way: an integer-overflow DoS and an X25519 key-recovery vulnerability — before anyone else could find them.
cargo-mutants: 124 mutants tested across kdf-core and tee-adapter's locally-testable scope — 0 missed. Every gap it found got a real test, not a suppression.
Stated plainly, so there's no guessing.
Integration is free for the first real design partner — an existing regulated custodian, exchange, or high-throughput signing operation willing to run this in a real or near-real deployment. No license fee, no integration fee.
In exchange: the right to reference the deployment as a real, in-production case study (scoped to whatever disclosure level you're comfortable with), and a revenue-share negotiated after a successful go-live — not before, and not assumed in advance.
If your team manages real signing infrastructure and key-rotation latency or exposure-window risk is something you've actually run into, that's the conversation worth having — not a sales pitch.
Private GitHub repo — full Rust source, benchmark reports, and the attestation artifact. Access granted under NDA on request.
A short technical scoping call — what your current key-rotation setup costs you today, and whether this is a fit.